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A PROPOSED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE CONTROL ACT*
G. Robert Blakey** and James A. Hancock*
"For that which taken singly and by itself may appear to be wrong,
when considered with relation to other things may be perfectly right -or
at least such as ought to be patiently endured as the means of preventing
something that is worse." '- Edmund Burke, Edmund Burke: Selected
Writings and Speeches 318 (P. Stanlis ed. 1963).
Debate over the propriety of using electronic surveillance' in the administra-
tion of justice has produced a literature "more remarkable for its volume
than its cogency." 2 Indeed, it is not totally unfair to say that no real progress
has been made in resolving the controversy in the forty years since the Supreme
Court divided so sharply in upholding the constitutionality of wiretapping in
Olmstead v. United States5 The Court's decision itself rested on a "harmful" 4
basis- the majority and dissent taking a polar, either-or approach to the
question of the constitutionality of wiretapping. There was, it seemed," no
* Since this article went to press, the Senate Judiciary Committee has reported out a
comprehensive electronic surveillance statute. N.Y. Times, March 28, 1968, at 27, col. 1.
The New York Senate and the Michigan House of Representatives have also passed similar
statutes. Needless to say, these statutes should be consulted in drafting any new state legis-
lation. Indeed, to the degree that the federal legislation will set national standards, state
legislation inconsistent with it will be invalid.
** Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. A debt of thanks must be acknowledged
to Professor Robert B. Rodes for his invaluable suggestions in drafting the model statute.
The responsibility for this version is, of course, ours alone.
*** Director, Student Legislative Bureau, Notre Dame Law School.
1 For the purposes of this article, the phrase "electronic surveillance" refers to the over-
hearing or recording, without the consent of one of the parties, of any communication uttered
by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying that expectation. Thus, it is coterminous with the protection
now afforded by the fourth amendment against "wiretapping" or "bugging." Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); cf. Lee v. Florida, 191 So. 2d 84 (1966), cert. granted, 389
U.S. 1033 (1968) (No. 174, 1967 Term). It does not, of course, include "recording"
with the consent of one of the parties. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); Rathbun
v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
2 F. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, in THE.
SUPREME CouRT REVIEW 33 (Kurland ed. 1961) (Dean Allen's remark was apropos of
the suppression rule). For a collection of articles on the use of electronic surveillance, see
M. PAULSEN & S. KADisn, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 900 (1962). See also A.
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967), unquestionably the best single volume in the area.
3 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
4 A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOm 340 (1967).
5 "Seemed" is the appropriate word here. This has certainly been the way the Olmstead
opinions, particularly Brandeis', have been read. See, e.g., The President's Message on Crime of
February 6, 1967, U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEws, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 168, 177 (1967). No
debate lasts long before wiretapping is termed a "dirty business." Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J. dissenting), or an "unjustifiable intrusion," id. at 478
(Brandeis, 3. dissenting). Indeed, those "who seek to legalize law enforcement tapping or eaves-
dropping soon find that they are 'toiling uphill against that heaviest of all argumentative
weights - the weight of a slogan.'" Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A
Professor's View, 44 MINN. L. REv. 891, 896 (1960) (footnote omitted). It seems clear, how-
ever, that Mr. Justice Holmes referred only to wiretapping in violation of a statute and never
reached the constitutional issue. See 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928). Moreover, a careful reading
of Justice Brandeis' opinion indicates that he did not condemn wiretapping per se, but rather
"wiretapping as was practiced in the case" before him, id. at 472 - which wiretapping the
record shows to have been indiscriminate and unrestrained. Thus, Brandeis did not argue for
an absolute "right to [be] let alone," but only for a right to be free from "unjustifiable intra-
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
room for compromise. The debate thereafter quickly acquired a "stylized"' set
of arguments that soon cut off the possibility of any meaningful dialogue. Since
then, division, delay and deadlock have been the result.'
A series of recent events, however, has now substantially altered that "in-
tolerable"' picture. A majority of the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and Administration of Justice has concluded "that legislation should be
enacted granting carefully circumscribed authority for electronic surveillance
to law enforcement officers.. ."' Recent opinions of the Supreme Court, Berger
sion." 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). The dissents of both men, despite popular opinion to the
contrary, may be read as open to the possibility of a statute that would set out a procedure on
the basis of which the intrusion associated with electronic surveillance might be justified.
6 Westin, The Wire-tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 COL.
L. REV. 164, 186 (1952).
7 Over the past forty years, approximately 50 bills, resolutions, and joint resolutions deal-
ing with court order wiretapping have been introduced in Congress. None have become law.
TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, STATE OP NEW YORK,
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES, THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 84 n.241 (1967) [herein-
after cited as INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES].
8 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 203 (1967) [hereinafter cited as THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY].
9 Id. This conclusion was reached apparently over strong opposition by Attorney General
Ramsey Clark. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1966, at 1, col. 7. The Attorney General's view can
only be described as, at best, "curious." He has publicly taken the position that electronic sur-
veillance is "neither effective nor highly productive." N.Y. Times, May 19, 1967, at 23, col. I.
Mr. Clark's opinion is not shared by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, I-
Edgar Hoover, who has, in sharp contrast, indicated that "we would never know what we do
[know] about the Cosa Nostra without electronic surveillance." THE PROSECUTOR 352 (Sept.-
Oct. 1967). Cf. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRIVY COUNCILLORS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE
INTO THE INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS 107 (1957), reprinted in Hearings on Wiretap-
ping, Eavesdropping, and the Bill of Rights Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 459 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as PRIVY COUNCILLORS REPORT] ("conclusive evidence of effectiveness"). The President's
Crime Commission, moreover, termed the intelligence gathered by the Bureau as "significant."
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 199. The Commission also noted that only the
Bureau had been able "to document fully the national scope" of organized crime. Id. at 192.
What may be obtained by the careful use of electronic surveillance techniques is not, of
course, information that routinely comes to the public's attention. Summaries of several FBI
"airtels" - communication from field offices to the national office of the Bureau in Washing-
ton - recently became public, however, during the course of a post-trial hearing in a tax case
in Providence, Rhode Island. The airtels dealt with the activities of Raymond Patriarca, a
Cosa Nostra "family" boss who, at one time, was thought to be a member of its highest ruling
body, the "Commission." Hearings on Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Before
the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 567 (1963). On another occasion, the FBI airtels were
described in these terms:
[T]hose 10 documents establish the existence of the Cosa Nostra; they establish
its structure; they establish the functions of the various members; they indicate the
power of the various members - for example, of the boss - they give you the size
of various families; they give you the geographical extent of their operations; and
they indicate that the Cosa Nostra actively operates in such States as Rhode Island,
Illinois, Maryland, Washington, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Florida, and Pennsyl-
vania. They give you also an indication that it operates on an international scale;
apparently a group is in Canada. They give you an indication of some of the illegal
activities by the Cosa Nostra, including murder, kidnaping, extortion, fraud, bribery,
loan sharking, and gambling. They give you some indication of their legal activities
- the infiltration of business, including legitimate gambling, labor unions, racetracks,
vending machines, and liquor. They show you that the associates of this one boss are
in every major area of the country and consist of every hood who has graduated
from the drugstore cowboy stage; all were contacted at one time or another by
Patriarca. The only description that I can give which accurately capsulizes those
airtels is this: Imagine if you could have had an electronic device in on an Italian
duke in the 16th century, such as Cesare Borgia, who was dispensing largesse, order-
ing killings, and all that sort of thing. That is exactly what you had when you put
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v. New York"0 and Katz v. United States.,-' have made it dear that electronic
surveillance techniques may be employed in the administration of justice within
the mandate of the Constitution requiring that searches and seizures be reason-
able. Legislation, too, is now pending in the CongressP and the legislatures of
a number of states' that would authorize electronic surveillance under court
order. 4 Finally, public opinion seemingly supports the enactment of such legis-
lation. 5 Thus, it seems that the community deadlock that followed Olmstead
is about to be broken.
The purpose of this article is not to enter into the still active debate on the
propriety of electronic surveillance, nor is it to reexamine the policy arguments
for and against court order electronic surveillance legislation.' 6 Debate needs
the device in on Raymond Patriarca, and it wasn't Italy; it was the United States,
and it wasn't the 16th century; it was today. Testimony of Professor G. Robert
Blakey, Hearings on Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the
judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 998 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Con-
trolling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement].
A more detailed analysis and the airtels themselves are reproduced in 113 CONG. REC. S.
11142-45, S 11149-53 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1967).
The record of the Department of Justice in bringing the hard-core of organized crime
"to book" underscores the need for enhanced evidence gathering procedures. Today there
are an estimated 5,000 members of the Cosa Nostra. Testimony of J. Edgar Hoover, Hearing
on Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropri-
ations for 1967 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 273 (1967). Yet between 1961 and .1966, indictments were returned against a
mere 185, and convictions obtained against only 102 members. Hearings on the Federal
Effort Against Organized Crime Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 19 (1967). Obviously, more needs to be done.
Since experience has shown that electronic surveillance is not only effective, but can be
employed without "harmful consequences" and only "infinitesimal" interference with "privacy,"
PRIVY COUNCILLORS REPORT 8(7), the case for its authorization would seem to be
established.
10 388 U.S. 41 (1967). The Berger decision has been followed by the endorsement of
permissive electronic surveillance legislation by such diverse groups as The Judicial Conference
of the United States, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1967, at 34, col. 1, The National Council on
Crime and Delinquency, N.Y. Times, April 21, 11368, at 36, col. 1 and the National District
Attorneys Association, Hearings on Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforce-
ment 615.
11 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, for example, the Court observed:
[I]t is clear that this surveillance [bug on telephone booth] was so narrowly
circumscribed that a duly authorized magistrate, properly notified of the need for
such investigation, specifically informed of the basis on which it was to proceed,
and clearly apprised of the precise intrusion it would entail, could constitutionally
have authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the very limited search and seizure
that ... took place. Here . . .a . . . judicial order could have accommodated "the
legitimate needs of law enforcement" by authorizing the carefully limited use of
electronic surveillance. Id. at 354-56 (footnote omitted).
12 E.g., S. 2050, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 13482, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
13 California, Assembly Bill 598, California Assembly, 1968 Sess. (1968); Michigan, H.R.
3729, Michigan House of Representatives, 1968 Sess. (1968); New York, Art. 370, § 370.05-.55
of the Proposed New York Criminal Procedure Law, Temporary Commission on Revision of
the Penal and Criminal Code (1967) [Article 370 is a replacement for § 813-a of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, which was declared unconstitutional in Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41 (1967)]; Pennsylvania, S. 1264, General Assembly of Pennsylvania, 1967 Sess. (1967);
Rhode Island, S. 356, General Assembly of Rhode Island, 1968 Sess. (1968).
14 Citations to present state legislation are collected in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,
47-48 nn.4-5 (1967). Mr. Justice Clark erroneously attributed to California a court order
statute. Id. at 47-48.
15 See, e.g., the public opinion poll conducted by the Mutual Broadcasting System, Hear-
ings on Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement 965 (80% of those
expressing an opinion supported giving the FBI wiretapping authority in national security
and organized crime cases). See also A. WESTiN, PRIvACY AND FREEDOM 207-08 (1967).
16 The arguments are reviewed in INDIVIDUAL LIBERTMS 87-93. The "fallacies" involved
[Vol. 43:657]
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to be brought down to specifics. Mr. Justice Holmes had a favorite admonition,
"[T]hink things instead of words."' It is our purpose, therefore, to give to
that debate a concrete proposal."' Our proposal is a statute that is intended to
serve as a starting point for meaningful dialogue; it is not meant to be the final
word in the debate. Here then is the statute, with commentary, 9 that we
propose:
in most of the arguments marshalled against court order legislation are treated in Testimony
of Professor G. Robert Blakey, Hearings on the Anti Crime Program Before Subcomm. No. 5
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 1028-31 (1967).
17 F. FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 79 (1938).
18 Our proposal is aimed at state legislatures, since on another occasion one of us has
already tried his hand at proposing national legislation. Blakey, Aspects of the Evidence
Gathering Process in Organized Crime Cases: A Preliminary Analysis, in TASK FORCE REPORT:
ORGANIZED CRIME 80, 106-113 (1967). The "Task Force" proposal has already formed
the basis of legislation introduced in Congress. See, e.g., S. 2050, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967);
H.R. 13482, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
19 The commentary is not intended to be exhaustive. In most cases the face of the
statute speaks for itself. The commentary is intended to briefly explain the problems to which
the statute is addressed and the general intent of the statute.
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ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE CONTROL ACT OF 19681
AN ACT TO PROHIBIT THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNICATIONS
BY PERSONS OTHER THAN DULY AUTHORIZED INVESTIGATIVE OR LAW EN-
FORCEMENT OFFICERS AND TO PROVIDE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF JUDICIAL ORDERS
UPON A SHOWING OF PROBABLE CAUSE AUTHORIZING SUCH OFFICERS TO INTER-
CEPT WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE INVESTIGATION OR PREVENTION
OF CERTAIN SPECIFIC OFFENSES AND REPEALING CERTAIN LAWS.2
[Insert appropriate enacting clause]'
Section 1. [Short Title.]4 This Act shall be known and may be cited as
the "Electronic Surveillance Control Act of 1968."
Section 2. [Definitions.] As used in this Act:
(a) "Wire communication"5 means any communication made in whole or
in part through the use of facilities:
(1) employed for the transmission of communications by the aid of
wire, cable or other like connection between the point of origin and the
point of reception; and
(2) furnished or operated by a communication common carrier.
(b) "Oral communication"6 means any oral communication uttered:
1 The draft attempts to follow the form established for uniform or model
acts in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS 396-403 (1966).
2 States have various requirements for titles. See generally Manson, The
Drafting of Statute Titles, 10 IND. L.J. 155 (1934). Should legislation be con-
templated, care should be exercised so that the requirements of the particular
state are met.
3 States have various forms for enacting clauses. Care should be exercised
to make sure the proper form is used because a mistake in such use can be fatal.
See, e.g., May v. Rice, 91 Ind. 546 (1883).
4 Some states have drafting rules against utilizing section headings. The
use of brackets should be taken as a warning to ascertain the local law on this
point. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 399 (1966).
5 The definition of "wire communication" is patterned after S. 675, 90th
Cong., lst Sess. § 10(1) (1967) which, in turn, is the bill long supported by the
United States Department of Justice. See, e.g., Testimony of Nicholas de B.
Katzenbach, Hearings on Criminal Laws and Procedure, Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 28, 33-35 (1966).
6 The definition of "oral communication" is taken from Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). See particularly the concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Harlan, id. at 361. The definition is composed of two elements:
(1) an expectation that the communication is not subject to "interception,"
[Vol. 43 :657]
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(1) by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication
is not subject to interception; and
(2) under circumstances justifying such expectation.'
(c) "Contents" 8 when used with respect to any wire or oral communica-
tion includes any information concerning the identity of the parties to such
communication or the existence, substance or meaning of such communication.
(d) "Intercepting device" 9 means any device or apparatus that can be
used to intercept a wire or oral communication other than:
(1) an extension telephone instrument installed for the purpose of
normal use by the subscriber or user; or
(2) a hearing aid or other device that corrects subnormal hearing
to not better than normal.
(e) "Intercept"'" means aurally acquire the contents of any wire or oral
and (2) a characterization of the expectation as "justifiable." A mere subjective
anticipation of privacy would not be controlling. Such an expectation might
be unjustifiable in, for example, a jail cell, Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139
(1962), but would ordinarily merit legal recognition in a person's home, Silver-
man v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), or his office, Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967). Nevertheless, the determining factor would not necessarily
be the person's location for the "Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). A judgment that an expec-
tation was justifiable would, in each case, depend upon a careful evaluation of
all the facts and circumstances. Id.
7 If we were writing on a clean slate it might be preferable to have a
single definition for "communication" - speech. But since Section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964), effectively outlaws wire-
tapping, it is necessary to draw a distinction between wire and oral communica-
tions until Congress amends that Section.
8 The definition of "contents" is patterned after S. 675, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 10(7) (1967). The privacy to be accorded to the communication itself
is intended to be complete.
9 Though the definition of "intercepting device" resembles S. 675, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(6) (1967) and S. 928, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2515(d)
(1967) (the Administration's "Right of Privacy Act") its scope is not as broad.
In order to be excluded from the definition of "intercepting device," and thus
from the Act, the "extension telephone instrument" need not be installed by a
communication common carrier. There is no reason, we feel, to give telephone
companies a monopoly over installation of telephone equipment by criminal
legislation. The suggested change is taken from the Testimony of Lee Loevinger,
Hearings on the Right of Privacy Act of 1967 Before the Subcomm. on Adminis-
trative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 518 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on the Right
of Privacy Act].
10 The definition of "intercept" is modeled on S. 675, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 10(5) (1967). The scope of the definition is intended to encompass
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communication through the use of any intercepting device, unless the use of
such device:
(1) is by a party to such communication or with the prior author-
ization of a party;" or
(2) is by an operator of a switchboard, or an officer, agent or employee
of a communication common carrier, acting in the normal course of his
employment while engaged in an activity that is a necessary incident to the
rendition of such carrier's service or to the protection of the property of
such carrier.'"
(f) "Person' means any officer, agent or employee of the [insert appro-
all forms of aural surveillance. Excluded are non-aural forms of surveillance
such as a searchlight, United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927) which was
cited with approval in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), or a
scintillator, Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966). An examina-
tion of telephone company records by law enforcement agents in the regular
course of their duties would be lawful under this definition of intercept, United
States v. Russo, 250 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1966). Finally, the proposed
legislation is not intended to prevent the tracing of phone calls by the use of a
"pen register" - a device used to record the number dialed from a given phone.
But see United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966).
11 Paragraph (1) largely reflects existing law concerning the giving of prior
consent by a party to a communication. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963) (oral communication); Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957)
(wire communication). Contra, People v. Kurth, 34 Ill. 2d 387, 216 N.E.2d
154 (1966). Consent is, moreover, intended to include both actual and implied
consent. For example, the use of electronic surveillance devices in banks and
apartment houses for institutional or personal protection would be impliedly
consented to if fair notice was given of their existence. Cf. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY
AND FREEDOM 60 (1967). Retroactive authorization would not be possible.
Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939). "Party" would mean a person
actually participating in a communication. United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d
193 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 839 (1964).
12 Paragraph (2) may be explained in these terms:
The major reason [for permitting this kind of interception] is, of course, to
permit satisfactory completion of the connection. Other reasons might be,
for example, to prevent fraud against a telephone company [See, e.g., United
States v. Beckley, 259 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Ga. 1965). But see Bubis v. United
States, 384 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1967).], to enforce priority requirements under
emergency conditions in the private line services, to enforce tariff regula-
tions prescribing different rates for communications services depending upon
the contents of the communications (e.g., press messages), and to enforce
other requirements of the tariffs and statutes relating to prohibited use of
common carrier facilities. Hearings on the Right of Privacy Act 516.
13 The definition of "person" is comprehensive. It explicitly includes
officers, agents, or employees of governmental units. But cf. Pierson v. Ray, 386
[Vol. 43:657]
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priate state] or political subdivision thereof, or any individual, partnership,
association, joint stock company, trust or corporation.
(g) "Aggrieved person"'14 means a person who was a party to any inter-
cepted wire or oral communication or any person against whom the intercep-
tion was directed.
(h) "Court of competent jurisdiction"' 5 means [insert appropriate courts].
(i) "Investigative or law enforcement officer"' 6 means any officer of the
U.S. 547 (1967). The governmental units themselves, however, are appro-
priately excluded here. See note 58 infra. Because of constitutional limitations
on state power, no attempt is made to reach the actions of federal officers. See
Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920). Contra, CAL. PENAL CODE § 632
(West Supp. 1967); Elson v. Bowen, 2 BNA CRIm. L. REP. 2265 (Nev. Dec.
20, 1967) (FBI agent must testify in civil suit concerning FBI bugging).
14 When considered with subsection 13(b) (1), infra, the definition of
"aggrieved person" delineates the class of persons who will be able to invoke the
suppression sanction. As such, it is intended to reflect existing case law. Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257 (1960); Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942); United States
ex rel. DeForte v. Mancusi, 379 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 390
U.S. 903 (1968) (No. 844, 1967 Term). Contra, People v. Martin, 45 Cal.
2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
We recognize, of course, that limiting the right to secure the suppression of
illegally seized evidence to those with standing correspondingly lessens its de-
terrent impact. Our judgment is, however, that as the exclusionary rule is applied
"time after time ... its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of di-
minishing returns, and beyond that its continued application is a public nuisance."
Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv.
378, 389 (1964). The standing rule, like the attenuation rule, provides a con-
venient and workable place at which to draw the line between "enough" and
"too much" - particularly when it is given the current liberal federal reading.
See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
15 "Court of competent jurisdiction" is not explicitly defined in the pro-
posed act. What is at issue here is a determination of what class of judicial
officers should be entrusted with supervision of the use of electronic surveillance
techniques in the administration of justice. Present federal search warrant
practice, for example, permits United States Commissioners and city mayors to
issue search warrants. 18 U.S.C. § 3041 (1964). Such a class is too broad for
the purpose of this Act. A narrower class should be defined. See, e.g., H.R.
13482, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2510(12) (1967) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
13482] which limits the issuance of electronic surveillance warrants to the chief
judges of the federal courts or their designates and to certain state court judges.
Depending on the structure of the state judicial system, an appropriately limited
class should be inserted here.
16 The definition of "investigative or law enforcement officer" raises an
issue analogous to that posed in defining "court of competent jurisdiction." See
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[insert appropriate police agency] who is empowered by law to conduct investi-
gations of, or to make arrests for, any offense enumerated in subsection (c) of
section 7 of this Act and any attorney authorized by law to prosecute or partici-
pate in the prosecution of any such offense.
(j) "Communication common carrier' means any person engaged as a
common carrier for hire in the transmission of communications by wire or radio.
Section 3. [Interception, Disclosure and Use of Wire or Oral Communi-
cations Prohibited.]"7 Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act, any
person who:
(a) willfully intercepts, endeavors' to intercept, or procures any other
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire or oral communication;
(b) willfully discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other person
the contents of any wire or oral communication, or evidence derived there-
from, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained
through the interception of a wire or oral communication; or
note 15 supra. That all police officers in a state, including town constables and
rural sheriffs, should be allowed to employ the techniques permitted by this Act
is questionable. A state might well, for example, decide that only the state police
should be entrusted with their use. See, e.g., S. 1264, General Assembly of
Pennsylvania, 1967 Sess. § 2(10) (1967). Whatever judgment is reached
should be embodied in the legislation at this point. Since the proposed statute
envisions close cooperation between police agencies and prosecuting officers, the
definition also extends to attorneys authorized by law to prosecute the types of
offenses in which warrants may issue.
17 This section of the proposed Act separately sets out prohibitions against
"interception," "disclosure," or "use." The history of the interpretation of Sec-
tion 605 of the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964), makes
this course advisable. Section 605 has been read to prohibit only "interception"
and "divulgence.' This interpretation is spelled out in the Testimony of Nicholas
de B. Katzenbach, Hearings on Criminal Laws and Procedures Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1966), and reflected in Testimony of
Ramsey Clark, Hearings on the Right of Privacy Act pt. 1, at 56. (The Attor-
ney General notes it would be "unwise" to "try to change the present policy under
section 605." Id.) The history of the interpretation of Section 605 is traced in
Brownell, The Public Security and Wiretapping, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 195, 197-
200 (1954), and roundly criticized in Donnelly, Electronic Eavesdropping, 38
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 667, 671-72 (1963).
As drafted, section 3 makes it explicit that its scope includes both the "con-
tents" of an intercepted wire or oral communication and "evidence derived
therefrom." "Knowledge" would be required where "evidence derived there-
from" was "intercepted," "disclosed" or "used." This follows Section 605.
18 The term "endeavors" is employed to avoid all of the technical common
law learning on "attempt." See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 333
(1966).
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(c) willfully uses or endeavors to use the contents of any wire or
oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having
reason to know, that the information was obtained through the intercep-
tion of a wire or oral communication;
shall be guilty of a felony and shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars
($10,000) or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." Subsections (b)
and (c) of this section shall not apply to the contents of any wire or oral com-
munication, or evidence derived therefrom, that has become common knowledge
or public information.2"
Section 4. [Possession, Sale, Distribution, Manufacture, Assembly, and
Advertising of Wire or Oral Communication Intercepting Devices Prohibited.]
(a) Except as otherwise specifically provided in subsection (b) of this
section, any person who:
(1) willfully possesses an intercepting device, the design of
which renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the interception
of a wire or oral communication;
(2) willfully sells an intercepting device, the design of which
renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the interception of a
wire or oral communication;
(3) willfully distributes an intercepting device, the design of
which renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the interception
of a wire or oral communication;
(4) willfully manufactures or assembles an intercepting device,
the design of which renders it primarily useful for the purpose of
the interception of a wire or oral communication; or
19 Violations must be "willful." See United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S.
389 (1933). Thus, good faith mistakes under the statute will not be subject
to criminal sanctions. This seems only just in light of the technical character
of the Act.
20 The last sentence of Section 3, in setting out what undoubtedly would
be held to be the law, is intended to forestall the necessity of such judicial inter-
pretation. The "disclosure"' or "use" prohibited by the statute should not reach
the "disclosure" or "use" of the contents of any wire or oral communication or
evidence derived therefrom that has become "common knowledge" or "public
information" after the communication is intercepted. For example, should the
contents of unlawfully intercepted communications be leaked by an imprudent
court attendant, who came in contact with them because inadequate security
precautions were taken by a court, the attendant himself might well be subjected
to criminal sanctions, but it would go too far to hold each person who repeated
the information criminally liable. A similar result ought to obtain in the situa-
tion where through regular court proceedings the contents become "public
information." Subsequent "disclosure" or "use," for example, in the press
ought not be prohibited. This last sentence of Section 3 insures that these
situations will not be held to fall within the statute.
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(5) willfully places in any newspaper, magazine, handbill or
other publication any advertisement of:
(i) any intercepting device, the design of which renders it
primarily useful for the purpose of the interception of a wire or
oral communication; or
(ii) any intercepting device where such advertisement pro-
motes the use of such device for the purpose of the interception
of a wire or oral communication;
shall be guilty of a felony and shall be fined not more than ten thousand ($10,-
000) dollars or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.'
(b) It shall not be unlawful under this section for:
21 Subsection 4(a) is patterned after S. 928, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. §
2512 (1967). It should provide "significant relief" against the present tide
running against privacy of speech. Testimony of Lee Loevinger, Hearings on
the Right of Privacy Act pt. 2, at 517. The prohibition against advertisement,
which includes intercepting devices of whatever design, "may well be one of the
most effective provisions of the bill .... Such advertising should be proscribed
as a means of curtailing the practice of eavesdropping and wiretapping." Id.
Only those intercepting devices primarily contrived for the acquisition of
the contents of wire or oral communications without the consent of a participant
are affected by paragraphs (1) through (4). But see Testimony of Ramsey Clark,
Hearings on the Right of Privacy Act pt. 1, at 49 ("spike microphone," "cuff
link microphone," and "martini olive transmitter"). Obviously, interpretation of
"primarily" will present difficult questions in some situations. That dose cases
can be foreseen, however, is never ipso facto a conclusive objection to a pro-
posed definition. Aristotle taught that "[P]recision is not to be sought for
alike in all discussions . . . it is the mark of an educated man to look for
precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits
.... " Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics (W. D. Ross transl.), in INrRODUC-
TION T o ARISTOTLE 309-10 (R. McKeon ed. 1947). A narrower definition
was thus rejected on the grounds that it would be too easily evaded. This
was the experience, for example, under the Gambling Device Act of 1951,
ch. 1194, 64 Stat. 1134, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1171 (1964), where after
eleven years' experience with a "precise" definition, language analogous to "pri-
marily useful" was adopted. See H.R. REP. No. 1828, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1962). Note, too, that a violation must be "willful." See note 19 supra. Good
faith mistakes would thus not be culpable.
A number of factors would be relevant in determining the character of
a device's design including such aspects as size, construction, portability and
method of operation. The existence of a clearly lawful purpose for the device
would go a long way toward excluding it from the scope of this subsection. See
Testimony of Lee Loevinger, Hearings on the Right of Privacy Act pt. 2, at
517-18. The sort of judgment called for indicates that in situations falling
neither clearly on one side nor the other, the testimony of an expert witness
would be of value. Cf. United States v. One Device, 160 F.2d 194 (10th Cir.
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(1) a communication common carrier or an officer, agent, or
employee of, or a person under contract with a communication com-
mon carrier, in the usual course of the communication common
carrier's business; or
(2) a person under contract with the United States, a state or a
political subdivision thereof, or an officer, agent, or employee of a
state or a political subdivision thereof;
to possess, sell, distribute, manufacture or assemble, or advertise any intercepting
device, while acting in furtherance of the appropriate activities of the United
States, a state or political subdivision thereof or a communication common
carrier.2
2
Section 5. [Confiscation of Wire or Oral Communication Intercepting
Devices.] Any intercepting device:
( 1 ) possessed;
(2) used;
(3) sold;
(4) distributed; or
(5) manufactured or assembled;
in violation of sections (3) and (4) of this Act may be seized and forfeited
to the [insert appropriate state] .23
Section 6. [Immunity of Witnesses.] Whenever in the judgment of [insert
appropriate prosecuting officer], the testimony of any witness, or the production
of books, papers or other evidence by any witness, in any trial, hearing, or pro-
ceeding before any grand jury or court of the [insert appropriate state] involv-
ing any violation of this Act, or any conspiracy to violate this Act, is necessary
to the public interest, such [insert appropriate prosecuting officer] may make
application to the court that the witness shall be instructed to testify or produce
evidence subject to the provisions of this section, and upon order of the court
such witness shall not be excused from testifying or from producing books, papers
or other evidence relating to any violation of this Act, or any conspiracy to
violate this Act, on the basis that the testimony or evidence required of him may
1947). What is required is a balanced judgment considering all the facts and
circumstances.
22 If the interception of wire or oral communications is authorized, it
will be necessary for a limited category of individuals to do what would other-
wise constitute a violation of subsection 4(a). This provision makes the neces-
sary exception. Note that the exception is carefully limited to "acting in further-
ance of the appropriate activities ... ." This proviso limits what might other-
wise be a tendency of the exception to swallow the rule.
23 Section 5 is modeled after S. 928, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2513 (1967).
It adds a significant additional sanction to the prohibitions of sections 3 and 4.
Since equipment employed in electronic surveillance is usually expensive, con-
fiscation of it should be a particularly effective method of stripping a profes-
sional eavesdropper of the tools of his trade and in taking off the market the
inventory of those who manufacture or sell prohibited devices.
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tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. No such
witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for, or on
account of, any transaction or matter concerning which he is compelled, after
having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce
evidence. No testimony so compelled shall be used as evidence in any trial,
hearing or proceeding against such witness. No such witness shall be exempt
under this section from prosecution for perjury or contempt committed while
giving testimony or producing evidence under compulsion as provided in this
section."
24 Since unlawful electronic surveillance is typically a clandestine crime,
often committed at the instigation of another person, the usual techniques of
criminal investigation will not be adequate to enforce the prohibitions of sec-
tions 3 and 4. In most cases, the privilege against self-incrimination will prevent
the ultimate principals from being held legally accountable. Thus, this provision
for granting immunity is necessary.
The language of section 6 is patterned after 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1964),
as amended, § 3486(c) (Supp. I, 1965), and 18 U.S.C. § 1406 (1964).
[Both of these federal provisions have been upheld by the Supreme Court against
constitutional attacks based, inter alia, on the fifth amendment. Reina v. United
States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960); Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).]
On the federal level, immunity grants must be approved by the Attorney General.
Because the relation between state attorney generals and local district attorneys
is not the same on the state level, see generally Note, The Role of the Prosecutor
in Utah, 5 UTAH L. Rnv. 70 (1957), a procedure involving prior approval of
the attorney general need not be followed under the proposed Act.
Immunity from prosecution rather than from use of testimony is afforded.
This is the conservative approach to what is constitutionally necessary. See
Blakey, Aspects of the Evidence Gathering Process in Organized Crime Cases:
A Preliminary Analysis, in TAsx FORCe. REPORT: ORGANIZED CRimE 85-87
(1967), for an alternative suggestion.
The last sentence of section 6 is probably unnecessary. See United States
v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943). However, since it is standard in most immu-
nity statutes, its omission might be unwise. Immunity from contempt or perjury
should not be afforded. See United States v. Orta, 253 F.2d 312 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 905 (1958). Compare People v. Goldman, 2 BNA
CR m. L. REP. 2319 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1967), with People v. Tomosello, 2 BNA
Crum. L. REP. 2320 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1967).
25 The intervention of a judicial officer is, of course, mandated by the
fourth amendment. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
26 This subsection echoes a number of proposed bills. See, e.g., S. 675,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a) (1967); Art. 370, § 370.05-.55 of the Proposed
New York Criminal Procedure Law, Temporary Commission on Revision of
the Penal and Criminal Code (1967) -article 370 is a replacement for §
813-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was declared unconstitutional
in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Subsection 7(a) centralizes, in
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Section 7. [Applications for Authorization or Approval of Interception
of Wire or Oral Communications.]
(a) The [insert appropriate prosecuting officer] may authorize, in writing,
any investigative or law enforcement officer to make application to a court 5
of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing the interception of any wire
or oral communication when such interception may provide evidence of any
offense enumerated in subsection (c) of this section."
(b) The [insert appropriate prosecuting officer] may authorize, in writing,
any investigative or law enforcement officer to make application to a court of
competent jurisdiction for an order of approval of the previous interception of
any wire or oral communication when the contents of such communication:
(1) relate to an offense other than that specified in an order of
authorization;
(2) were intercepted in an emergency situation; or
(3) were intercepted in an emergency situation and relate to an
offense other than that contemplated at the time the interception was
made.27
a publicly responsible official subject to the political process, the formulation and
implementation of law enforcement policy on the use of electronic surveillance
techniques in the administration of justice. This subsection is drafted to pro-
vide an option of either limiting authorization to the state attorney general -
the path followed by S. 1264, General Assembly of Pennsylvania, 1967 Sess. § 8
(1967) -or to include as well local district attorneys. Centralization in the
attorney general, or the attorney general and the local district attorneys, will
thus avoid the possibility of divergent practices developing, and if abuses should
occur, the lines of responsibility will be clear.
27 While subsection 7(a) treats applications for an order of authoriza-
tion, this subsection deals with applications for orders of approval. The need
for such orders is posed by three distinct, but related, situations.
The first situation is covered by paragraph (1). It deals with the situation
where, during the course of an interception authorized for a specific offense, an
interception is incidentally made of a communication relating to another offense.
See, e.g., People v. Grossman, 27 App. Div. 2d 572, 276 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1966),
rev'd on other grounds, 20 N.Y.2d 346, 229 N.E.2d 589, 283 N.Y.S.2d 12
(1967) (murder overheard on fraud bug). Under a strict interpretation of
the particularity requirement of the fourth amendment, this evidence as such
could not be used or disclosed. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196
(1927). But cf. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) [the Sixth Circuit read Harris as modifying Mar-
ron in United States v. Eisner, 297 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1962)]. See also Harris
v. United States, 88 S.Ct. 992 (1968) ("plain view" seizure not during search
upheld), and the Brief for Respondent at 9-13 (argument for seizure of evidence
in "plain view" during a permissible search). Paragraph (1) sets up a procedure
modeled on present search warrant practice under which use and disclosure
might be based upon a subsequent court order. See, e.g., Aron v. United States,
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(c) An application for an order of authorization as provided in subsection
(a) of this section or of approval as provided in paragraph (2) of subsection
(b) of this section may be authorized only when such interception may provide
or has provided evidence of any of the following offenses: [insert appropriate
statutory references].2"
Section 8. [Procedure for Authorization of Interception of Wire or Oral
Communications.]
382 F.2d 965, 973 (8th Cir. 1967); State v. Hunter, 235 Wis. 188, 292 N.W.
609 (1940). Such a procedure represents the "safe" way to handle this problem.
The second situation is covered by paragraph (2). It deals with the
"'emergency situation." Often in criminal investigations a "meet" between
known criminals will be set up and held almost simultaneously. Requiring an
advance court order in these situations -where the facts establishing probable
cause may be the most compelling and the dangers of overbroad or overlong
surveillance the least- would be tantamount to failing to authorize surveillance
at all. When there is no time to obtain an order, the police have always been
thought to have emergency power. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). This paragraph
recognizes the applicability of this traditional principle in the area of the use
of electronic surveillance devices, a position the Supreme Court questioned, but
left open for future resolution in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-58
(1967).
The third situation is covered by paragraph (3). It deals with the situa-
tion noted in paragraph (1) when it occurs during a period of emergency
interception. Again, a procedure is set up for an order of approval.
28 This subsection imposes a category limitation on the use of electronic
surveillance techniques. See, e.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 200.660(a) (1963). The
limitation is only placed on orders of authorization and orders of approval in
the emergency situation. Where surveillance is once lawfully undertaken, it
would be wholly arbitrary to limit the use or disclosure of what is overheard
on subsequent orders of approval to set categories of offenses. What protection
from unnecessary invasions that might have accrued from the category limitation
will already have been lost. When the issue is subsequent use rather than initial
authorization, truth, not privacy, is the dominate interest.
Subsection 7(c) is modeled on S. 675, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a) (1967).
Since any list must, to a certain extent, be arbitrary, no judgment is reached
orl what specific crimes should be included. The point remains, however, that
a line ought to be drawn. Testimony of Robert F. Kennedy, Hearings on Wire-
tapping - The Attorney General's Program - 1962 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, 22-23 (1962). It is suggested that
the offenses selected should be either serious in themselves or characteristic of
organized crime. Cf. Piuvy COUNCILLORs REPORT ir 65 (crimes carrying "three
years imprisonment" or those involving a "large number of people"). A list
might, therefore, include, at a minimum: murder, kidnapping, extortion, robbery,
bribery, syndicated gambling, narcotics, or any conspiracy involving any of the
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(a) Each application for an authorization to intercept a wire or oral com-
munication or for approval of the previous interception of any such communi-
cation shall be made in writing " upon oath or affirmation and shall state:
(1) the authority of the applicant to make such application;
(2) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer for
whom the authority to intercept a wire or oral communication is sought
and the identity of whoever authorized the application;
(3) a complete statement of the facts relied upon by the applicant,
including:
(i) the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense
and whose communications are to be or were intercepted;
(ii) the character and location of the wire communication
facilities involved or the place where the oral communication is to
be or was intercepted;
(iii) the type' of communication to be or which was intercepted;
and
(iv) a statement showing that other investigative procedures
have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear or appeared to
be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous; ' and
(4) a complete statement of the facts concerning all previous ap-
plications, known to the individual authorizing and to the individual
making the application, made to any court for authorization to intercept
or for approval of the previous interception of a wire or oral communica-
tion involving any of the same facilities or places specified in the applica-
tion or involving any person whose communication is to be or has been
intercepted, and the action taken by the court on each such application.
above offenses. Such a list could be expanded or contracted as experience
develops.
29 A written application is not required by the Constitution. Sparks
v. United States, 90 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1937). It is, however, a requirement
under FED. R. CRIM. P. 3-4; cf. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480,
485-88 (1958). Requiring a written application makes good sense since police
agencies will be forced to "shape their detection functions with an awareness
of the decision-making processes that are likely to follow." L. TIFFANY, D. Mc-
INTYRE and D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME ix (1967). Inadequate
affidavits may get by a favorite judge on the initial application, but they will
"backfire" at trial. Id. at 120. "Forum shopping" will thus be kept to a mini-
mum. Cf. PRIVY COUNCILLORS REPORT 79 (written authority should be
required).
30 Since the conversation itself may not, of course, be described before
it is spoken, description of "type" meets the test of particularity of offense
required by the fourth amendment. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,
56-57 (1967).
31 See note 35 infra.
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(b) The court may require the applicant to furnish additional testimony
or documentary evidence in support of the application.
(c) Upon such application, the court may enter an ex parte order, as
requested or as modified, 2 authorizing or approving the interception of a wire
or oral communication, if the court determines on the basis of the facts sub-
mitted by the applicant that there is or was probable cause13 for belief that:
(1) the individual whose communication is to be or was intercepted:
(i) is engaging or was engaged over a period of time as a part
of a continuing criminal activity; or
(ii) is or was committing, has or had committed or is or was
about to commit at a specific time;
an offense3' as provided in subsection (c) of section 7 of this Act;
(2) facts concerning such offense may be or have been obtained
through such interception;
(3) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed
or reasonably appear or appeared to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to
be too dangerous;35 and
32 "[S]ome rather weak cases," Mr. Justice Holmes observed in The
Mangrove Prize Money, 188 U.S. 720, 725 (1903), "must fall within any law
which is couched in general words." Giving the court explicit discretionary
power to refuse to grant, or to grant as modified, will serve to guarantee that
the use of these techniques will be confined to the situations which are clear-cut.
33 The "probable cause" standard is, of course, a requirement of the
fourth amendment. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
34 The Supreme Court, in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55-57
(1967), made it clear that blanket authorizations could not be squared with
the concept of reasonableness in the fourth amendment. See id. at 100 (Harlan,
J. dissenting) (duration must be related to character of offense). Paragraph
(1) of subsection 8(c) attempts, therefore, to draw a distinction between
"course of conduct" and "incident" surveillance. Where it is shown that
an individual is engaged in an offense as "part of a continuing criminal
activity," proportionately longer surveillance may be authorized than where
the evidence only establishes that a "single incident" is about to occur. This
will guarantee that "no greater invasion of privacy [will be] permitted than [is]
necessary under the circumstances." Id. at 57; cf. PRiVY COUNcILLORs REPORT
73 (not "kept on longer than ... necessary for the case in hand").
35 The Supreme Court recognized in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,
60 (1967) that a showing of "special facts" or "exigent circumstances" will
be necessary to justify recourse to an electronic surveillance technique where
the subject is not given notice before its use. See generally Blakey, The Rule of
Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States and Ker v. Califor-
nia, 112 PA. L. REv. 499 (1964). The same principle was recognized in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355-56 n.16 (1967). This paragraph, embodying
a requirement for such a finding, is modeled on the English standard for the
use of wiretapping on the Home Secretary's warrant. PRIvY COUNCILLORS
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(4) the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire or oral
communications are to be or were intercepted, are or were being used, or
are or were about to be used, in connection with the commission of such-
offense, or are or were leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used
by, such individual.
(d) The interception of wire or oral communications shall be conducted
in such a manner as to minimize or eliminate the interception of such com-
munications not otherwise subject to interception under this Act. 6
(e) If the facilities from which a wire communication is to be or was
intercepted are or were public,"2 no order of authorization or approval shall be
issued unless the court, in addition to the matters provided in subsection (c)
of this section, determines that there is or was a special need to intercept wire
communications over such facilities.
(f) If the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire or oral com-
munications are to be or were intercepted are or were being used, or are or were
about to be used, or are or were leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly
used by, a licensed physician, a licensed attorney-at-law, or practicing clergy-
man, or is or was a place used primarily for habitation by a husband and wife,
no order shall be issued unless the court, in addition to the matters provided
in subsection (c) of this section, determines that there is or was a special need
to intercept wire or oral communications over such facilities or in such places.3
REPORT 11 64; P. DEVLEN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 65-69
(1958). It is also reflected in proposed legislation. See, e.g., H.R. 13482 §
2518 (c) (1) (D). The normal investigative procedures referred to would include,
for example, standard visual or aural surveillance techniques, general question-
ing, interrogation under an immunity grant, use of regular search warrants,
or the infiltration of conspiratorial groups by informants or undercover agents.
Merely because a normal investigative technique was theoretically possible, how-
ever, it would not follow that it was "likely" to succeed. See, e.g., In re Grand
Jury Investigation of Giancana v. United States, 352 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965). What the provision envisions is that the evi-
dence produced be tested in a practical and common-sense fashion based on all
the facts and circumstances. Cf. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102
(1965).
36 This reflects the approach of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
354 (1967).
37 Surveillance of a public telephone booth is potentially one of the
most sensitive uses of electronic surveillance techniques. Therefore, it ought
not to be undertaken without some special showing in addition to that otherwise
required. Such a showing of "special need" might, for example, be made
where the applicant establishes that the individual consciously avoids the use
of regular phones. See, e.g., The Activities of Raymond Patriarca, Hearings on
Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement 938, 946. In
this situation, surveillance might properly be authorized.
38 Subsection (8) (e) attempts to surround the public telephone with
[June, 1968]
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE CONTROL ACT
No otherwise privileged wire or oral communication intercepted in accordance
with, or in violation of, the provisions of this Act, shall lose its privileged
character."
(g) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire
or oral communication shall specify:
(1) the jurisdiction of the court issuing the order;
(2) the individual, if known, whose communications are to be or
were intercepted;
(3) the character and location of the communication facilities as
to which, or the place of the communication as to which, authority to
intercept is granted or was approved;
(4) the type of the communication to be or which was intercepted;
(5) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer to
whom the authority to intercept a wire or oral communication is given
or was approved and the identity of whoever authorized the application;
and
(6) the period of time during which such interception is authorized
or was approved.
(h) No order entered under this section shall authorize or approve the
interception of any wire or oral communication for a period of time in excess
of that necessary under the circumstances. Every order entered under this
section shall require that such interception begin and terminate as soon as prac-
ticable.4" In no case shall an order entered under this section authorize or
approve the interception of wire or oral communications for any period exceeding
thirty days4 1 Extensions of such an order may be granted for periods of not
special protections. In a like fashion, this provision attempts to grant similar
protection to certain well recognized categories of privileged communications.
See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (3d ed. 1940). It should serve
to guarantee that the incidental interception of otherwise privileged communi-
cations will be held to a minimum.
39 While most jurisdictions today recognize one or more categories of
privileged communications, they very often hold them inapplicable where an
eavesdropper seeks to testify. E.g., Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 230 Mass. 567,
120 N.E. 209 (1918). Thus, the privilege is thought to be solely that of re-
stricting the testimony of the spouse, confessor, lawyer, or doctor. The last sen-
tence of this provision is designed to change that rule. Otherwise, the use of'
electronic surveillance techniques might indirectly undermine the various social
policies represented by the various privileges.
40 These first two sentences reflect the strict time limitation of the fourth
amendment set out in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967), and Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353-56 (1967). "Practicable," of course, does
not mean an unlimited period. In the event, the interception could not begin
relatively soon, it might be necessary to return and secure a new order. At
what point this would be required would be a question of fact in each case.
41 This time limitation is made necessary by progressive "staleness" of
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more than thirty days. An extension shall not be granted unless an application
for it is made in accordance with this section, and the court makes the findings
required by this section.42
Section 9. [Procedure for Approval of Interception of Wire or Oral
Communications.]
(a) An order of approval of the interception of any wire or oral com-
munication relating to an offense other than that specified in the order of
authorization may be issued where the court finds on an application for an
order of approval as provided in section 8 of this Act that such interception
was otherwise made in accordance with this Act. Such application shall be
made as soon as practicable."
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, any investigative
or law enforcement officer who determines that:
(1) an emergency situation exists that requires a wire or oral com-
munication to be intercepted immediately; and
(2) there are grounds upon which an order could be entered to
authorize such interception;
may intercept such wire or oral communication if an application for an order
of approval of such interception is made in accordance with section 8 of this
Act within forty-eight hours after the interception has occurred or has begun
to occur.44
(c) An order of approval of the interception of any wire or oral com-
munication may include the approval of the interception of a wire or oral
communication in an emergency situation where the communication relates to
an offense other than that contemplated at the time the interception was made
if the court finds that such interception was otherwise made in accordance with
this Act. Such application shall be made as soon as practicable.
(d) In addition to any other right to appeal, the [insert appropriate state]
shall have the right to appeal from a denial of an order of approval made under
this section if the [insert appropriate prosecuting officer] shall certify to the
court that the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay. The appeal shall be
taken within thirty days after the denial was made and shall be diligently prose-
cuted.45
the original showing of probable cause because of the passage of time. Cf. People
v. Dolgin, 415 Ill. 434, 114 N.E.2d 389 (1952) (49 days is all right where
the course of conduct is shown); see generally 100 A.L.R.2d 525 (1965).
42 The absence of this sort of provision was criticized in Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
43 Subsections (a) and (c) of this section are addressed to the problems
discussed in note 27 supra concerning paragraphs (1) and (3) of subsection
7(b). The application should be made as soon as "practicable." No set time
limitation is intended. But as soon as it is reasonable after such an interception
is made, or its relevancy becomes clear, the order should be sought.
44 This subsection is addressed to the problem discussed in note 27 supra
concerning paragraph (2) of subsection 7(b).
45 See note 55 infra.
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Section 10. [Maintenance and Custody of Records.]
(a) Any wire or oral communication intercepted in accordance with sec-
tions 8 and 9 of this Act shall, if practicable, be recorded by tape or wire or
other comparable method. The recording shall be done in such a way as will
protect it from editing or other alteration. Immediately upon the expiration
of the period the order or extensions thereof, the tapes or wire recordings or
other records shall be transferred to the court issuing the order and sealed under
its direction.48 Custody of the tapes or wire recordings or other records shall
be maintained wherever the court directs. They shall not be destroyed except
upon an order of such court and in any event shall be kept for ten years. Dupli-
cate tapes or wire recordings or records may be made for disclosure or use pur-
suant to subsection (a) of section 12 of this Act. The presence of the seal
provided by this section, or a satisfactory explanation for its absence, shall be
a prerequisite for the disclosure of the contents of any wire or oral communi-
cation, or evidence derived therefrom, under subsection (b) of section 12 of
this Act.
(b) Applications made and orders granted under sections 8 and 9 of this
Act shall be sealed by the court. Custody of the applications and orders shall
be maintained wherever the court directs. They shall not be destroyed except
on order of the court and in any event shall be kept for ten years. They may
be disclosed only upon a showing of good cause before a court of competent
jurisdiction.
(c) Any violation of the provisions of this section may be punished as
contempt of the issuing or denying court.
Section 11. [Inventory.] Not later than ninety days after the termination
of the period of the order or extensions thereof or the date of the denial of an
order of approval, the issuing or denying court shall cause to be served on the
individual named in the application an inventory which shall include:
(a) notice of the entry of the order or the application for a denied order
of approval;
(b) the date of the entry of the order or the denial of the application for
an order of approval;
(c) the period of authorized, approved or disapproved interception; and
(d) a record of the relevant contents of the interception, if any, of wire or
oral communications."'
46 This subsection embodies the return requirement of the fourth amend-
ment set out in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967), and Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967).
47 This section is patterned after H.R. 13482 § 2518(i). See also
FED. R. Crm . P. 41(d). The language of Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,
60 (1967), seemed to indicate that such an inventory is constitutionally required.
The Court's opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-57 (1967),
however, seems less insistent. In any event, an inventory requirement is included
since we feel that it serves the sound social policy of ultimately making all elec-
tronic surveillance less "surreptitious." Through it, each individual against whom
[V7ol. 43:657]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
On an ex parte showing of good cause, the court may postpone the serving of
the inventory required by this section. 8
Section 12. [Authorization for Disclosure and Use of Intercepted Wire
or Oral Communications.]
(a) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who has obtained knowl-
edge of the contents of any wire or oral communication, or evidence derived
therefrom, may disclose or use such contents or evidence to the extent that such
disclosure or use is appropriate to the proper performance of his official duties. 9
(b) Any person who has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire
or oral communication intercepted in accordance with sections 8 and 9 of this
Act, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose the contents of such communi-
cation or evidence while giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any
criminal trial, hearing, or proceeding before any grand jury or court.5 0
(c) The contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evi-
a surveillance order is issued will have his day in court to vindicate any unjus-
tifiable invasion of privacy that might have occurred. Cf. PRIVY COUNCILLORS
REPORT f[ 134 (distaste of surveillance based on secret character without oppor-
tunity to object).
48 The last sentence of section 11 covers those situations in which it may
be necessary to postpone the serving of the required inventory. For example,
where interception is discontinued at one location, because the subject moves,
but is re-established at a new location, or the investigation itself continues and
looks into the activities of close associates of the subject, it will be necessary to
postpone the filing of an inventory until the investigation is complete. Other-
wise, the investigation might be aborted. This is the type of showing of "good
cause" the provision envisions.
49 This subsection constitutes the basic authorization for disclosure and
use by law enforcement agents of evidence directly or indirectly obtained through
electronic surveillance techniques. It envisions such use and disclosure in sys-
tems of criminal intelligence, see, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAW ANN. §§ 42-37-1 to 3
(Supp. 1967) (New England State Police Compact), to establish probable
cause for arrest, Ginsberg v. United States, 96 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1938), to
establish probable cause to search, Foley v. United States, 64 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 289 U.S. 762 (1933), or to develop witnesses, In re Saperstein,
30 N.J. Super. 373, 104 A.2d 842, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 874 (1954); New
York v. Saperstein, 2 N.Y.2d 210, 140 N.E.2d 252 (1957). The range of pos-
sible uses is wide.
50 This subsection constitutes the basic authorization for evidentiary use
of the product of electronic surveillance techniques. Its use, it should be noted,
is limited to criminal proceedings. While the subsection envisions no direct use
of illegally intercepted communications, there are situations, however, where
illegally intercepted communications might properly be used to unmask affirma-
tive perjury, Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), or against those
who have no standing to complain of the illegality, Goldstein v. United States,
316 U.S. 114 (1942).
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dence derived therefrom, may otherwise be disclosed or used only upon a showing
of good cause before a court of competent jurisdiction."
Section 13. [Procedure for Disclosure and Suppression of Intercepted
Wire or Oral Communications.]
(a) The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted in ac-
cordance with sections 8 and 9 of this Act, or evidence derived therefrom, shall
not be disclosed in any trial, hearing, or proceeding before any court of [insert
appropriate state] unless ten days before the trial, hearing, or proceeding:
(1) the inventory as provided in section 11 of this Act has been
served; and
(2) the parties to the action have been served with a copy of the
order and accompanying application under which the interception was
authorized or approved. 2
The service of inventory, order, and application required by this subsection may
be waived by the court where it finds that the service is not practicable and that
the parties will not be prejudiced by the failure to make the service.
(b) (1) Any aggrieved person5 3 in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in
51 This subsection explicitly puts into the system of rigid disclosure and
use an essential measure of flexibility. It recognizes that in certain cases it may
be permissible to use what was originally gathered for criminal prosecution for
other purposes. The authorization of such use shall be made on a case by case
basis and only when there has been a showing of "good cause." Congressional
investigations in the past, for example, have found court order wire taps to be
"vitally important." J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT § 6.00 n.16 (1959).
Such use for purposes other than the original criminal prosecution would
undoubtedly result without this provision- as witnessed by the present ex-
perience of the disclosure of information secured under New York's court order
statute. See, e.g., Hearings on James R. Hoffa and Continued Underworld Con-
trol of New York Teamster Local 239 Before the Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 50 (1961). Although the range of possible situations where "good
cause" might be shown under subsection 12(c) remains obviously large, it must
surely be narrower than present practice where no such showing is required.
The provision should thus be viewed as a "limitation," not an "authorization."
Reliance will have to be placed on the sound discretion and good sense of the
judicial officer- on which so much of the practical administration of justice
depends. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939).
52 This subsection, by requiring that notice of intent to use the com-
munications be given before trial, is designed to guarantee that disputes over
the legality of intercepted communications will be raised and settled before the
trial on the merits. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939).
It is modeled on S. 675, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(f) (1967). The provision
is also designed to give the person against whom the intercepted communica-
tion is to be introduced an adequate opportunity to defend himself in this
obviously technical area of the law.
53 The definition of "aggrieved person" is discussed in note 14 supra.
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or before any court or other authority of [insert appropriate state] may move
to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or
evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that:
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
(ii) the order of authorization or approval is insufficient on its
face;
(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order
of authorization;
(iv) service was not made as provided in subsection (a) of this
section; or
(v) the seal provided in subsection (a) of section 10 of this Act
is not present and there is no satisfactory explanation for its absence.
The motion shall be made at least ten days before the trial, hearing, or pro-
ceeding unless there was no opportunity to make the motion or the moving
party was not aware of the grounds for the motion. If the motion is granted,
the contents of the intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived
therefrom, shall not be received in evidence in the trial, hearing, or proceeding. 4
(2) In addition to any other right to appeal, the [insert appropriate
state] shall have the right to appeal from an order granting a motion to sup-
press if the [insert appropriate prosecuting officer] shall certify to the court
that the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay. The appeal shall be taken
within thirty days after the date the order was entered and shall be diligently
prosecuted.55
54 This subsection sets out the procedure that an "aggrieved person" must
follow to secure the suppression of illegally intercepted communications. A
culpable failure to make the motion before trial would warrant its denial.
Segurola v. United States, 275 U.S. 106 (1927). Thus, it guarantees that the
disputes will be settled before trial. Finally, it serves to protect the prosecutor's
right of appeal, discussed below. See Giacona v. United States, 257 F.2d 450,
455 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958).
55 State practice is mixed on the appealability of pretrial motions to
suppress. This provision reflects the judgment that the need for uniformity in
the interpretation of the law governing the use of electronic surveillance tech-
niques warrants granting the right. Compare, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN
A FREE SOCIETY 140 (recommendation of general right). It should be noted
that subsection 9(d) authorizes the appeal of the denials of an order of
approval, since such a denial would be tantamount to the granting of a motion
to suppress. The language of both this provision and subsection 9(d) closely
follow 18 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1965), which grants the federal prosecutor a
right to appeal in narcotics cases.
56 Appellate courts have, of course, upheld the theoretical possibility of
recovery for unlawful wiretapping or bugging. See, e.g., LeCrone v. Ohio Bell
Tel. Co., 120 OHIO APP. 129, 201 N.E.2d 533 (1963); Roach v. Harper, 143
W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958). Nevertheless, recovery seems to be de-
pendent upon the existence of a property right in the place bugged or the phone
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'Section 14. [Authorization for Recoveryl of Civil Damages.]
(a) Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, dis-
closed or used in violation of this Act shall:
(1) have a civil cause of action 8 against any person who intercepts,
discloses or uses or procures any other person to intercept, disclose or use,
such communication; and
(2) be entitled to recover from any such person:
(i) actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages com-
puted at the rate of one hundred dollars ($100) a day for each day
of violation, or one thousand dollars ($1,000), whichever is higher;
(ii) punitive damages; and
(iii) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs rea-
sonably incurred.
(b) A good faith reliance on a court order or legislative authorization shall
constitute a complete defense to an action brought under this section.5"
(c) As used in this section, "person' includes [insert appropriate state]
and any political subdivision thereof, and the state or any political subdivision
thereof shall not assert its governmental immunity to avoid liability under this
section.5"
Section 15. [Reports Concerning Intercepted Wire or Oral Communica-
tions.] In December of each year, [insert appropriate prosecuting officer] shall
report to the [insert appropriate legislative or judicial body]:"
(1) the number of orders applied for;
(2) the kind of orders applied for;
(3) the number of orders denied and granted as applied for or as
modified;
tapped. It thus contained the same theoretical defects that were only recently
remedied in constitutional theory in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
This provision is designed to do the same thing in the civil area. It is modeled
on H.R. 13842 § 2520.
57 This provision makes explicit what would probably be followed in
practice. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
58 Existing tort theory allowing recovery for invasions of privacy by law
enforcement officers is less than satisfactory. See generally, A. WESTIN, PRIVACY
AND FREEDOM 330-64 (1967); Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of
Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955). The major defect is the
existence of sovereign immunity. Subsection 14(c) is intended to eliminate it
and any other immunity that would insulate an individual from the conse-
quences of his actions when suit is brought under this section. But see Bradley
v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
59 Here it will be necessary to select the appropriate legislative or judicial
body to which the annual report should be made. See, e.g., S. 1264, General
Assembly of Pennsylvania, 1967 Sess. § 11 (1967) ("Chief Justice"). The
important point is that there be some system of public accounting that allows
the community within which the procedures are used to evaluate their con-
tinuing social utility. Cf. PRIVY COUNCILLORS REPORT 119 and 133.
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(4) the offenses specified in the orders or the applications that were
denied;
(5) the period of time of the interceptions;
(6) a general description of the interceptions, with a separate category
for each offense, including:
(i) the character and frequency of incriminating communications
intercepted;
(ii) the character and frequency of other communications inter-
cepted;
(iii) the number of persons whose communications were inter-
cepted; and
(iv) the character, amount and approximate cost of the man-
power and other resources used in the interception;
(7) the number of arrests resulting from the interceptions;
(8) the offenses for which the arrests were made;
(9) the number of trials resulting from the interceptions;
(10) the number of motions to suppress made, denied and granted in
connection with the interceptions;
(11) the number of convictions resulting from the interceptions; .and
(12) the offenses for which the convictions were obtained.
Section 16. [Conformity to Federal Law.]
(a) The provisions of sections 8 and 9 of this Act shall not be deemed to
authorize or approve the interception of a wire communication where such
interception would constitute a violation of any law of the United States.60
(b) Notwithstanding any provision of sections 7 through 15 of this Act,
any court to which an application is made in accordance with sections 8 and 9
of this Act may take any evidence, make any finding, or issue any order required
60 Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1964), makes the "interception" and "divulgence" of wire communications -
even intrastate, Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939), and by state law
enforcement officers pursuant to court order, Benanti v. United States, 355
U.S. 96 (1957) -a federal crime. This provision thus suspends the operation
of those sections of the proposed Act that are applicable to wire communications
until Congress modifies the federal statute.
61 This provision makes explicit the power of a court to do what the
New York Court of Appeals did in People v. Kaiser (Dec. 7, 1967). In Kaiser,
the court rehabilitated Section 813-a of the N.Y. Code of Criminal Procedure,
which the Supreme Court had struck down in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41 (1967). It held that in the future Section 813-a must be read in light of
Berger and that all the defects which the Supreme Court found on the face of
the statute must now be cured. In short, Kaiser read Berger into Section 813-a.
This provision will thus guarantee the smooth working of the statute whatever
the course of federal constitutional decisions. It will also have the effect of
automatically conforming the state statute to any national legislation Congress
might enact.
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to conform the proceedings or the issuance of any order of authorization or
approval as provided in sections 8 and 9 of this Act to the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States or of any law of the United States.6 '
Section 17. [Insert appropriate severability clause.]
Section 18. [Insert appropriate repeals.]
Section 19. [Insert appropriate effective date.]
